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However there are textual components on this page with highly
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by Louis de Broglie. For that reason, these texts are kept here
though some of the formulations are more ripe the Yoga6dOrg Economy
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Archived texts on this page as follows all from before 2011,
written by Aristo Tacoma, alias S H W Bråten Reusch;
They can be redistributed using the same type of copyright
and redistribution notice as written on the always
updated page, pls confer it]


Joy and the human brain,
as a quantum unit, Aristo Tacoma,
2009 as also on]]]
By the word "definition" we mean an indication of what to
an enlightened mind are clear ideas as to how each word
(or abbreviation) of key importance, usually quoted,
should be used in this context.
By the word "axiom" we mean an indication of a principle
which is intuitively evident in the enlightened,
sensitive mind with a great deal of wholeness-awareness
and gratefulness as to the whole of existence, and of key
importance in bringing about proofs.
By the word "proof" we mean an indication of a way in
which an enlightened mind can find light in a passage-way
from earlier theorems, definitions and from the axiom (or
axioms, but here we have but one axiom) to a new theorem.
By the word "theorem" we mean an indication of some sort
of key understanding upon which we can build more
theorems as well as definitions in subsequent work.
By the concepts definition, axiom, proof and theorem we
do not mean anything such as a fully explicit scheme
without hidden assumptions; but we mean, by the constant
reference to the concept "enlightened mind", also that
these hidden assumptions are, though hidden, valid
assumptions. There may be five hundred or five hundred
thousands such, or even very many more -- indeed, the
author would postulate very many more -- to carry out the
pathways of reasoning as here indicated. THIS MEANS THAT
rather it is an attempt to intuitively indicate
milestone-conceptual points in a vast landscape of
patterned understanding which may occur again and again
in the earnest person whose quest resides in the depth of
creative enlightenment. This, then, is part of a
neopopperian enquiry which blends the empirical question-
and-answer with the intuitive question-and-answer but the
emphasis is here, except where explicitly mentioned, on
the latter. (This author has made strong criticism
earlier on as to sloppy use of the word 'proof'; but
here, then, the word has been re-introduced without that
sloppiness but also without the pretense of
"Comparison", in this context, refers to a clear-cut
mechanical procedure for finding similarities, contrasts
and patterns of similarities and contrasts of the 10-
digit-system digits of two finite-digital numbers of the
32-bit kind.
"Resonance", in this context, refers to the notion of
patterns of similarities and contrasts (whether in the
connotation of comparison or of general perception).
"General perception", or GP, refers to the analogy of
comparison as applied to essences.
"Human perception", or HP, refers to perception (both
inner and outer) pertaining to the human mind/brain.
"Essence number", or, simply, "essence", refers to a
member of the structure E.
"The structure E", or simply, "E", refers to the
necessary minimum infinite gathering, or an extension of
this, this necessary minimum proven by exam thesis by
this author from 2003 [[[as reprinted also in a 2009 book
by this author (Philosophy of the Infinite) as listed on
the page with full manuscript included
(cfr link which mentions "..theory of the universe"
there.]]], which includes the numbers 1, 2, 3, ..., and
zero, and also the signed -1, -2, -3, ... (If you consult
this exam thesis and the discussions around it, it will
be clear that there are numbers involving infinite digit-
series and infinitely great quantities inside this
necessary minimum.)
  We will here regard all numbers, also e.g. 1, 2 and 3,
as infinite-digited, e.g. ...0001, ...0002, and ...0003.
Definition 1 of PMW is in a physics context (... 2004).
Definition 2 will come in this more principal context and
we will show that they are aligned in meaning and
"Quantum unit", or QU, refers to a whole whose process is
not merely caused by a local interaction of its parts,
and which has a direct relationship, in some way or
another, to the fluctuating energic behaviour (as
empericially studied) related to the energies of the
order of the very microscopic Planck's constant.
Some more definitions inside the THEOREM section.
The completing theorem, building on the earlier, involves
pointing out that the (human) brain is a (also) a quantum
unit. This has implications for consciousness research
Simplicity Axiom, or SA: Only that which in the silent,
enlightened mind is perceived as needed, exists.
Theorem 1, or T1:
GP generates new members in E.
Proof of T1.
There are more than one infinite member in E. This is
shown by the exam text of 2003, for else there would be
only one inifnite member of E, in which case the mapping
of two different infinite-digited transcendent numbers
would not be possible.
  The GP involves, pr def of GP, similarities, contrasts
and resonances between (two or more) E numbers (but two
of a kind will suffice as a start). Let's call them E1
and E2.
  GP finding similarities, contrasts or resonances over
E1 and E2 involves digit series -- the whole infinite
digit series or portions of them, having similarities,
contrasts or resonances.
  Let the portions, which may be the whole of each of E1
and E2, be called P1 and P2.
  The simplest way of exhibiting a clear-cut similarity,
contrast or resonance between digit series E1 and E2 is
by means of another digit series.
  By SA, this is then how the GP is exhibiting itself --
by constantly creating new members of E out of the
Theorem 2, or T2:
The members in E are represented by means of series of
digits in the 10-digit-system.
Proof of T2.
The simplest way of generating E is by means of the
'addition by one' as applied indefinitely to 1, then to
the result of this, 2, then to the result of this again,
and onwards; repeated with the signed numbers, with the
zero defined as the sum of plus one and minus one. The
simplest way of extending E beyond its necessary infinite
minimum is by means of the process in T1. This, then, by
SA, is how it is generated.
  A digit series involving addition, substraction,
multiplication and division as part of the very structure
of the digits in their operational meaning will naturally
and simply lend itself to analysis in terms of some
extensions, including the remainder, or MOD operator, and
in terms of procedures to decide whether a number, like
5, is a prime or not (it is a prime). The meaning of the
numbers is inadequately perceived unless also as
perceived in terms of this very essential property of not
being able to be divided on any other numbers than itself
and one without producing fractions. In order to have GP
at all, which is needed, we need the notion of prime
numbers; and this is the simplest way of coming towards
GP beginning with numbers and addition as indicated
above. By SA, this is then how it is.
  But a prime number sequence gives fundamentally
different properties to digit-systems. The least-numbered
digit-system is the 2-digit-system, or binary digit
system, also sometimes the ground for computer
technology. It is a convention to sometimes write binary
numbers as e.g. 10010 (which is written 18 in the 10-
digit-system) or 11101 (which is written 29 in the 10-
digit-system). It is not simple to perceive over two
numbers written this way, although it is simple to make
mechanical devices which act on the presence or on the
absence of an electrical impulse. But by SA, this rules
out the 2-digit-system for how members of E is naturally
exhibited in perception.
  If the digit-system involves a great deal of digits,
say, as in a 500-digit-system, or even in a 20-digit-
system, complexities arise -- in part due to the lack of
similarity of the digit tokens, in part due to the lack
of easy divisibility on a large quantity of the ground
digits used.
  It is clear, in addition, that division by 2 is a
sought-for property relative to contrast perception. This
suggests that the number ought to be prime. However, for
perception to operate in the simplest way, a prime number
which emphasises similarity and thus, in a sense,
wholeness, ought to be part of the key number of the
digit-system. Since similarity perception needs an
organizing digit, and since similarity perception is
vitally and essentially other than contrast perception,
it ought to be a clearly perceivable contrast between the
prime digit indicating contrast -- 2 -- and the prime
digit indicating similarity. The next candidate, by these
criterions of simplicity, is 5. The simplest number that
contains both these prime factors is 10. By SA, a 10-
digit-system is the appropriate one for exhibiting digits
of members of E.
  (We have not specified which 10-digit-system -- whether
it is going to be A B C D E F G H I J or K L M N O P Q R
S T or @ # $ % ^ & * ( ) or 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or
something else. It is not part of the discussion to
assert this here. We will follow convention in an
English-language-context and use the latter sequence.
This is of course not to say such decisions cannot yield
to such enlightened forms of deductive thinking by SA as
we have done on the key points in this article.)
Theorem 3, or T3:
That which exists is infinite digit series of the 10-
digit-system type.
Proof of T3.
For anything to exist at all -- and it is a perception
that anything exists -- it has to conform to SA. The
simplest numbers like 1 and 2 and 3 are, clearly, the
simplest possible forms of existence; their very
existence carries within them elementary arithmetic. So,
by SA, this exists. But this, by the exam thesis, is
adequate to show that E exists. By T2, it is existing in
a 10-digit-system type. By T1, a generation is going on
of new members in E. There cannot possibly be any
structure that cannot be a portion of, or the whole of, a
member of E, or a combination of several such. By SA,
then, that which exists are infinite digit series of the
10-digit system type.
  Acknowledgement: completely outside of this context and
these types of reasonings over infinity and so on, the
notion of existence as essentially represented by
streaming digit series was presented to me by Geoffrey
Read during informal discussions in connection to a
seminar at Jesus College, Cambridge in 1992.
  We further note that Pythagoras is associated with a
claim that 'all is numbers'. However the same is
associated with a claim that numbers which have
indefinitely many decimals, like the square root of two,
are not as good, as primary, as important or as essential
as numbers which can be written by means of a finite
amount of digits. Pythagoras certainly did not claim that
existence is based on the numbers of anything like the E-
structure that we have defined here.
Definition 2 of PMW, or the Principle of a tendency of
Movement towards Wholeness (the first definition is
mentioned in the section Definitions above).
  PMW is the action of GP on essences.
  The justification for this definition is that by T3,
anything which exists, does so by E-membership; by T1, GP
acts on E to make new members of E; by definition of GP,
this involves the bringing-about of enhancement of
similarities, contrasts and patterns of these; but this
is what definition 1 of PMW is all about.
Theorem 4, or T4:
Local interaction is an instance of PMW.
Proof of T4.
In a general sense this follows from T3. However as it is
not obvious given the context of definition 1 of PMW I
will state it as a theorem and then give an alternative
way to show it, which sheds light on the it. The
alternative way is as follows:
  Any interaction involves at least two entities. These
entities are, say, E1 and E2, or expressions of them in
some way. But we have not introduced the notion of
distance in this context yet. Rather, in the context
where definition 1 of PMW was given, it was introduced as
the notion of spaceduration. Spaceduration is the
bridging of the three dimensions of manifest space with
an extra dimension of duration, and then more dimensions
as needed to bring a whole, and spoken about as one
supermodel, just as anything else which exists is spoken
about as supermodels; and PMW then as how new supermodels
are generated by the perceptive-like action upon existing
supermodels, and their linking-back to them. But this
shows that the concept of the supermodel relates deeply
and well to the concept of the members of E as here
  We note in passing that in the 8-sphere theory (cfr
..., 2009, by this author), it is mentioned that it is an
implication of the infinity theorem (viz., the proof by
this author in 2003 exam that E doesn't have the
possibility of being closed off to contain only and all
finite members) that dimensions cannot be asserted to be
fundamentally separate. As soon as we grant, e.g. by
empirical studies, a validity of having duration as a
dimension next after the three dimensions for manifest
space, we are then led directly to the notion of
spaceduration by this theorem; and so can do without
general relativity -- we still get the entwinedness of
duration and space.
  But then the relationship as near to each other of E1
and E2 is but a relationship of a particular kind, with a
particular set of similarities, contrasts and patterns of
similarities and contrasts of E1, E2 and E3, where E3 is
spaceduration. As GP operates on these, new members are
created and somehow these are handed to the upcoming
manifest moment, giving the appearance of perhaps a
relatively continous movement of the same. In fact it is
a transition. There is then no fundamental shift in
saying that PMW can operate here and that PMW can operate
in a context where the particular similar relationship of
E1 and E2 to E3 is not present.
New definition
A "non-quantum unit", or "NQU", is a unit whereby the PMW
exhibits itself by local interactions but where any PMW
operating on the whole unit is not usually exhibiting
itself immediately.
Theorem 5, or T5:
A digital 32-bit computer in good working order is an
Proof of T5.
A digital 32-bit computer in good working order exhibits
a pattern of boolean logic operations on binary number
sequences which are so that the whole unit, in this case,
can be understood as grounded on the local interactions
involving these binary number sequences as represented by
electrical impulses having a localized interaction upon
each other in fixed ways. This interaction may happen by
means of semiconducting metals like silicon and while the
notion of semiconducitivity involves the describing of
these units as quantum units, this description is
factorised into separate units which are not nonlocally
tied together to one quantum unit in the working
New definition
A "Quantum amplifier", or "QA", is a structure whereby a
microscopic energetic fluctuation at the order of
Planck's constant has effects on a considerably larger
energetic scale.
  This is a very general definition, and many different
kinds of material structures (say) may fit it. A key
criterion is that there is some way in which something
such as so enormously small as about the energy of a
single not hypercharged electron can somehow tilt the
balance of a much larger energy, perhaps stepwise to
higher and higher energies. One can imagine a perfectly
balanced extremely sensitive apparatus which is so that
an extremely minute difference in electron flow (say) can
tilt its next state to A rather than B, or B rather than
A. If this minute difference is on the order of Planck's
constant, then Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, or HUP,
has some relevance. However HUP doesn't have to be
introduced in a context of genuine full uncertainty, cfr
the 2004 book by this author (link to it rather at top of
the and pages) and various other
notes also by this author before and after this as for
the lack of validity of the bohrian interpretation.
New definition
An "extreme-coherent unit", or "ECU", is a unit which is
characterised by so pervasive quantum nonlocality
features throughout that it is arguably very little left
of validity of a local interaction description of its
parts. Examples of ECU are, of course, superfluidity,
superconductivity and, on a much smaller scale, the two-
subatomic-particle-situation as studied by EPR/Aspect
(Aspect with two photons instead of two electrons, but
same principle).
New definition
That PMW "operates" on a unit means that PMW has a direct
immediate nonlocal effect on the unit based on a
perception of the unit as a whole.
Theorem 6, or T6:
The PMW operates on a unit, if it operates at all on it,
in the simplest way.
Proof of T6
PMW is nought but GP. A unit is a collection of members
of E, or a single member of E. GP applied to this
collection or to this single member can generate
something which can be handed to the next manifest
moment. In manifest reality, this will appear as the
whole interacting directly with its parts, although, seen
from the angle of more dimensions, including durations
and nonlocalities at various levels, there are other ways
of talking about it.
  In any case, if we keep to the perspective of the whole
operating on the whole or on its parts nonlocally, which
is, since the perspective of manifest world is a valid
and important perspective in general, itself a valid and
important perspective, there various ways in which this
can happen. One is the situation of ECU. We will look at
other ways. By SA, the simplest way will be the way that
it happens.
Theorem 7, or T7:
Something not a ECU can be a QU.
Proof of T7.
That ECU is a QU is obvious. That something which is not
an ECU can be a QU is less obvious. And indeed we would
then naturally talk of a 'subtle nonlocality' in such a
case. But we have, by the definition of QA, just above,
shown a type of material structure where local
interaction may well be predominant which is nevertheless
such that energies at the order of Planck's constant can
play a key role.
  To see that something which is not a ECU can be a QU,
let us be clear that it is when PMW operates on a unit so
as to express itself also on that unit, that it is a
quantum unit. When a unit has extreme coherence, such as
in the superfluid state, this happens through that
extreme coherence. But in a state which is very
factorized into many compartements of localized
interactions, it is not simple but in fact very complex
to reorganize so that all of these compartments suddenly
coherently respond to a single impulse from PMW. It is
likely that where there is a lot of factorisation, and
factorisations again within these factorisations, down to
levels of fluctuations which are overridden -- such as in
a digital computer of the 32-bit kind which is in good
solid working order -- most fluctuations at the Planck
level of energy will be going into the background as
relatively irrelevant. It is only when a lot of coherence
is as if enforced on the structure that a PMW can cause
an effect without disregarding the patterns which ought
to apply on the individual material constituents. Thus,
it is not in principle impossible that all electrons of a
macroscopic unit like a fruit, an orange on the table,
suddenly moves, say, north; but it requires an immense
and extremely complex imposition of coherence. Thus while
it is not impossible it is not simple and so does not
easily occur.
  However, if a unit is equipped with a QA, the PMW has a
simple way of expressing itself, and so, if it operates
at all on the QA, it will express itself in this the
simplest way, and thus the unit is, in that situation, a
quantum unit, even though its coherence is not extreme.
Theorem 8, or T8:
HP is an instance of GP.
Proof of T8.
By T3, that which is, including the human brain/mind (and
pervasive and persuasive empirical studies in the last
half of the 20th century and early 21st century shows
correlations at least for most manifestly strong
consciousness states as reported by human beings,
including attention and perception processes, and for
brain activation patterns), can be said to be members of
E; and on the members of E, GP operates. It is the
intuitive perception of perception in human beings with
human brains (having such correlations as mentioned) that
this perception (HP) is alive and essential and purely
infinite. This description of HP shows that HP is, on the
surface, very similar to GP, although its domain of
operation is less general. The dynamic and generic nature
of HP as intuitively experienced by the human being with
the human brain is so as to suggest it is not itself
identical to one member of E, and it needs to exist even
so, and by SA, it will then have to be nothing other but
an instance of GP. For it would not be simple to have yet
another GP-like process.
Theorem 9, or T9:
The human brain is a QU.
Proof of T9:
It is a trivial observation made by many that the human
brain has a sensitivity which at least in some situations
go all the way to energies at the order of Planck's
constant (made for instance by David Bohm in his book
Quantum Theory, published in the early 1950s). For
instance, synaptic connections between two neural cells
have an effect on the overall activity patterns of the
human brain. In some situations, where the balance is so
that one state or another state may arise [[[the
meditator may think of whether to say-in-thought or not-
say-in-thought the creatively chosen mantra sound for
that day in-the-next-moment as an open door for decision-
and-attention]]] based on the firing or not firing of one
synapse in the next moment. But this firing or not firing
may itself be bordering on happening or not happening,
all the way down to the minuscle sizes of energies
involved in the quantum fluctuations. In other words, the
human brain can have a QA-like situation.
  The T7 asserts that a PMW-effect can then occur.
  For it to occur, the PMW must operate on the whole of
the brain -- or on an even larger whole, such as the
whole body including head and the brain -- and it must
have a way to express itself. But it does have a way to
express itself -- the QA-like situation is just this.
  By T8, human perception is an instance of the general
perception which operates on essences. But human
perception may easily, in fact does easily, relate to the
whole body including the head and this includes the
brain; and this also evidently, as reported by numerous
humans in a variety of contexts in quite persuasive ways,
includes a direct experience of the states of mind/brain
directly -- a perception of the patterns of the
perceptive process, a proprioception, -- and subtler
feelings in this -- and more.
  So the PMW -- instanced by HP -- does operate on the
unit -- the brain -- and can do so by means of the QA-
like situations which obviously easily can arise in many
circumstances (esp. the meditative states but also dreams
and states lingering near orgasm and more), -- these are
simple ways in which the PMW can express itself and by T6
these are the ways in which it expresses itself.
  But this means that the activity of the brain is not
merely the result of the local interaction of its parts,
because the PMW reflects immediately and nonlocally the
whole and yet have an actual effect, even if the brain is
not necessarily extremely coherent. And so the criterion
for saying that the human brain is a quantum unit is

Aristo Tacoma: Role of Boolean Logic in Natural Language Reasoning Simple, original Boolean Logic, carefully applied, may elucidate natural language reasoning A course in simple, early, original boolean logic may enhance our capacities to engage in clear, analytical language and reasoning involving this language. However, we must caution ourselves when it comes to so-called higher-order logic, which is different in nature (and perhaps not as coherent), as well as too simplified or overdone application on logical pathways on our natural, rich language. Boolean logic in its original form involves the emphasis on very simple forms of relationships, involving that which is natural language is easily translated as AND, OR, NOT and IF (or implication). This can also involve certain interpretations of words such as necessity and 'sufficient condition for'. For instance, one can imagine a person who, before going to bed, says something like this: "Tomorrow, if it is sunny and hot, and I'm full of energies, I'm going have a swim and then go to a cafe." Given boolean analysis and the type of analysis that is inspired by it, one could interpret this as -- Condition:sunny AND condition:hot AND condition:full- of-energies === is sufficient condition for: === action:swim; action:to-cafe In some connections, less oriented towards action and more to conceptual analysis of relationships involving existence, to say that A is sufficient condition for B is in some sense equal to saying that B is a necessary condition for A. For instance, when we say that an Earth gravitates objects near it this is a sufficient condition to say that an apple near Earth falls towards Earth. So, in a sense, to say that an apple near Earth falls towards Earth is a necessary condition for it to make sense to say that Earth gravitates objects near it. This type of analysis leads us to think about such forms of reasoning as this: when we assert that "A is necessary for B", then it takes an instance of not-A together with B to disprove the assertion. Whereas, when we assert that "A is sufficient for B", it takes an instance of A together with not-B to disprove the latter assertion. Somebody well trained in this can read rules, regulations, contracts, as well as scientific articles with a sense of having an upper hand, if the rest of the concepts have been well enough defined. For someone like me who has worked a bit on trying to get a grips on the foundations of mathematics and its possible contradictions, it is however a very dramatic shift from this type of boolean logic -- which in a way is a key part of the engine of all strong programming languages, and even part of the design of the electronics underlying computers -- and the type of logic called "higher-order logic". In the case of "higher-order logic", we find for instance the not-quite-successful attempts of Bertrand Russell with his teacher Alfred North Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica to formulate things about "all possible sets with such and such characteristics". (Whitehead's later quantum-inspired Process and Reality book is something entirely different and far more coherent.) What we can call "elementary boolean logic" does not dabble with abstract and rather pretentious concepts such as the ALL-operator or IT-EXISTS-operator. In this way, complicated infinities and their self-references are also avoided. Elementary logic is therefore, like good rugged 32-bit numbers of a well-known range, something that -- within its limits -- does make solid sense. Having said as much, it is important to be aware of the richness of possibly very significant nuances and finer shades of meaning associated with each word and phrase in a natural trans-cultural language like English. While in a tough debate it may be important to accept and appreciate certain boolean pathways of reasoning, we must not degrade natural language to be as if equal to explicit syntatical schemes such as these.
Aristo Tacoma: On the Influence of a Company's Big Goals on its Ethics The persuasive, subtle influence of the stated (or advertised) main goals of a company Entirely innocent-sounding (at first) contrasts in how a company formulates the major, main, big goals for itself -- not necessarily on paper, but in repeated statements to its own employees, -- perhaps as relayed in advertising -- may have enormous yet subtle implications for the activity of the company, ethically speaking -- and therefore also in terms of its possibility of survival. Listen for the moment to the difference between three types of goals -- exemplified by concrete goals in something as concrete and rediculously elementary as car washing: 1 === "We aim at the highest quality in car washing" 2 === "We aim at being the best-in-town at car washing" 3 === "We aim at satisfying our customers better than all others when it comes to car washing." The third goal has the psychological component -- satisfaction is involved. The second goal has the comparison factor, as does also the third, with other companies. The first goal involves the objective reference to quality. It is sometimes said that a company exists primarely to provide profit to its owners within the constraints set by the current laws and regulations for the country / state within which a company operates. But this is obviously entirely misleading, in all cases where we have to do with a company that has any hope of long-term survival. For if one's only relationship to constraints is that of laws, then it opens for all sorts of cunning, mediocre, misleading approaches which will make the company self-destruct after some years, rather as some of the major financial institutions during the global financial crisis of 2008. Constraints involves not only laws, but meaningfulness, ethics, love of work, passion to do something worth the while, and for not few, also the religious motivation of satisfying the highest, God. Moreover, these constraints are typically implicit in the expressed goals as given by advertising or as repeated in statements inside the company on company newspapers and the like, and again repeated by bossess during internal seminars. It is these constraints which are psychological in the third type of goal above, comparative (also) in the second, while objective -- oriented towards quality -- in the first. (I am grateful, by the way, for a lecture about quality given by Robert Pirsig, author of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, in Oslo, ca. 1994, at the University of Oslo, co-arranged with the MC Union, Oslo.) It is my contention that meaningfulness of work is enhanced when there is a good relationship to objective quality (we may also say "interobjective"). As this is not a question of hypnosis of the customer, nor a question of bullying the other companies in town, it leads also to peace of mind. However, when the aim involves comparison, it may also invite techniques so as to put others (rightly or not) down. And when the aim involves satisfying the customer, it may involve ways of deluding the customer to come into this satisfied state of mind. When we look at very large corporations, who may also operate a significant form of media -- such as a newspaper or TV channel -- some goals, though at face value appearing quite normal, may invite the strategical thinkers to engage in establishing that which (my father Stein Braten has labelled as, and which) is called a "model monopoly". Here, the viewers quality judgements are not oriented towards the objective, but rather towards that which leads to the satisfaction of the company goal. The lack of ethics of such an implication of the goal may lead to the swift and fierce undoing of the company, however large, in the long run. It is therefore my postulate that in any society where free enterprises built by individuals exist such as are allowed to formulate they own goals, and/or advertise with a sense of goals associated with them, a great deal of intelligent enquiry ought to take place into the REAL and FULL implications of the stated goals on the daily running of the company, in order to ensure a meaningful ethical development in the relveant society.
Aristo Tacoma: On the Coherence of the Copenhagen Interpretation Group The out-then-in-then-out position of legendary physicist Louis de Broglie If anyone is to list the top five, or certainly ten, physicists in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory as it shaped itself fairly early in the 20th century, it would be rediculous to leave out the French physicist Louis de Broglie. However, his opinions eventually led him to break with the group -- and thus we get information on the coherence (or lack of it) of this group. "...Les deux Memoires conjoints que M. David Bohm a publies en janvier 1952 dans la Physical Review ont ramene l'attention sur la question de l'interpretation de la Mecanique ondulatoire. "... En particulier, il a ramene l'attention sur la possibilite d'une interpretation de la Mecanique ondulatoire autre que celle qui est actuellement adoptee et il a montre qu'il n'est pas inutile de soumettre la question a un nouvel examen minutieux. "... Telles sont quelques-uns des resultats interessants developpes par M. Bohm dans ses Memoires, mais la partie ls plus originale de son travail est certainement sa theorie de la mesure que nous allons maintenant analyser. ..." -- Louis de Broglie in his book 'Une Tentative D'Interpretation Causale et Non Lineaire de la Mecanique Ondulatoire', Paris 1956 [[[anglified latin letters here; the quote is also in a book listed high up on my frontpage; the next sentence should have had the same year -- 1956 -- in it -- author; By the way, I picked this extraordinarily important book for the documentation of the REAL history of quantum theory out of an extra section in the cellar of the Institute of Physics at the University of Oslo and I'm grateful to the librarian for opening their vault; it shows that there were shock-waves of what Bohm which was NOT ignored by the founding fathers of quantum theory, contrary to what has been claimed again and again; but rather, de Broglie dismissed totally one part of Bohm's novel contribution and accepted totally another part of his contribution -- again, in contrast to the fuzzy muddy-headed term Bohm/Broglie or Broglie/Bohm interpretation.-- A.T.]]] In 1952, Louis de Broglie, whose contribution to essential, core quantum theory lies primarely in his equation linking matter with frequency (frequency being a wave concept), published a book where he breaks with the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory. When, decades earlier, de Broglie had come up with his wave equation, he had wanted to give a realistic interpretation of the waves he imagined that it referred to, to the extent that any matter component such as an electron could be said to be equipped with what he called a "pilot wave". At the time, he was not able to carry this visualisation through in terms of coherent mathematics. In particular, an argument (which was not critically analysed before J.S.Bell did so in the 1960s) by von Neumann showed an inconsistency. Heisenberg, in post-WWII writings, comments that Niels Bohr -- in some ways a "leader" of the so-called "Copenhagen Interpretation" -- argued for hours with de Broglie (who had a cold and was in bed) until, out of fatigue, de Broglie gave up and gave in and went back into the fold. It is not my purpose to give introduction to any of these concepts here. Even a mild and vague introduction to the Copenhagen Interpretation would require at least one whole book. But let us remark that a key feature of this interpretation of the equations of core equations in quantum theory involves affirming that the more or less wave-like "probability clouds" it operates with cannot be said to exist in the same real way as manifest particles such as measured electrons. If one of the uppermost five, or at least one of the uppermost ten, physicists in the core Copenhagen Interpretation group disagreed in fundamentals, it raises, to my mind, questions about the coherence of this group. The scientific spirit of relating to facts rather than to wishful thinking calls therefore on attention as to this disagreement without prejudice. The inconsistency that von Neumann's work pointed out in the first version of de Broglie's pilot wave theory was avoided by Bohm's very different causal interpretation from 1952 by Bohm's ingenious inclusion of the observing apparatus in the quantum wave equation, instead of, as with Bohr's work, assuming that, by and large and vaguely formulated, the observing apparatus stands outside of the experimental situation and simply records the events. Louis de Broglie fetched this part of Bohm's work, re-incorporated into his own original pilot wave theory, and was able to show that von Neumann's proof of inconsistency no longer applied. Alas, he was ignored. In the 1960s, J.S.Bell, being puzzled over why Bohm's interpretation wasn't hampered by the inconsistency of early pilot wave theory, proved -- again, vaguely spoken here -- that in one way or another, a visualization of the underlaying phenomena that quantum theory refers to must either be inconsistent or include what is now trivially called "nonlocality". Put simply, then, local pilot wave theory is inconsistent, while nonlocal pilot wave theory -- or interpretation of the core quantum equations -- may not be inconsistent. The coherence of the Copenhagen Interpretation group, therefore, is called into question.
Aristo Tacoma: Musings On The Forth Class of Programming Languages Three classes of programming languages are proposed, among many more, in an attempt to place the language Forth by C. Moore from the 1960s into a position where some features of it may be perceived anew. Contents In the 1960s, a development from algorithmic languages towards what eventually became so-called "object-oriented languages" such as C++, Smalltalk, etc, took place. Kristen Nygaard and Ole-Johan Dahl developed full class and inheritance and object concepts in 1967 with their Simula67. With Chuck Moore's Forth, a different approach emerged in the same decade, more elusive, less defined even perhaps now. In any complete programming language, one can get done all the things one can do in any other complete programming language -- but there are always some differences in speed, in interface features, and such. As Larry Wall, creator of Perl has pointed out, the real difference lies in how easy it is to get something done. Others, focussing on security or on collaboration, may emphasise how easy it is to enforce a standard, a code, a scheme, and to avoid hard-to-detect programming complications. Let us be aware of what goals of use we have in mind as we seek to enforce categories on something such as programming languages. If the goal is to fit a business with business applications, the natural categories are different, say, than if you are aiming at stimulating your own science fiction writing through interesting graphical conceptual structures in a stand-alone PC setting. This writer, although interested in business applications of some kinds, has goals such as the latter (but not limited to these), and I feel that much is left unsaid by some of the 'canonical' categorisations that one can find in collectively (and rather anonymously) edited web-encyclopedicas. Forth appeals, we might say, to individuals who seek a degree of maximum control over the computer and a minimum of barriers (of some kinds) combined with interactivity while programming. As with C, it is possible to store and fetch and perform functions by means of their address directly in RAM. Similar to Perl, it is more interpretative than C, but in ground-structure far simpler as far as compiler design, for it does not need to parse something such as function-name(data-name1, data-name2, function-name2() ); but rather it parses something such as data-name1 data-name2 function-name2 function-name It is this type of code that Java is compiled into -- theso-called "byte-code". It is also this type of code that controls some printers (Postscript). Many people have given a good description of Forth -- and there are many versions of Forth and extensions of Forth. A rather "classic" collection -- also of docs -- is found at the remarkably stable website, where e.g. Tom Zimmer's Win32For has been a joy for many of us. It is possible to list advantages and disadvantages of Forth versus a more recent form of object-oriented language such as Java or C# or Objective C, but it may be somewhat more fruitful to rather compare the conceptual family or language class that we can say that Forth belongs to, and which is fundamentally different than object-oriented languages. I think it is meaningful to operate with many familes of languages, although not necessarily exactly the set of words as given by those too heavily influenced by object-oriented programming, which has almost become a paradigm -- and which therefore may obstruct perception at some key points as to what should characterise other language families. To not make a secret of it, this writer has worked on a language which has learned from some features of Forth, while developed some novel features and enhanced other features in Forth. (An example for artists exploring new game concepts and interested in Forth-inspired programming can be found rather at the bottom of the page at, called Y4DGAME.TXT, and can be performed through a Dosbox given certain installations indicated around there. These things are educational and for free.) Let me attempt a characterisation of three classes of languages, not forgetting that there are several key classes of programming languages which could be mentioned in addition, some of which are called upon in science. === FALP flexible algorithmic languages, prefix === OOL object-oriented languages (usually prefix) === PWFL postfix warp-friendly languages To the first class, FALP, we include such as C and Perl, typically used in a compiler-fashion but not necessarily so, typically prefix -- function-name before data -- but possibly also infix (3 + 3), and occasionally postfix. These may include, like Perl, objects as option but are not strictly "oriented" towards hierarchical objects, classes and inheritance like e.g. Java. These are more flexible than Algol as well as Pascal in its Wirth-form (but e.g. FreePascal for FREEDOS is flexible and allows objects, too). because they allow functions to be listed as data and called onthrough pointers, but this flexibility may not be very easy to use and it is typically not very streamlined in its syntactical appearance. The OOL class is wide and rich and mainstream, and we need not in 2010, when this informal musing is written, exemplify it. Let us point out that however some prefer FALP to OOL languages because some OOL languages like Java prevent access to some pointer data in the background, and may require many lines to do what can be done with much fewer lines when it comes to listing many functions associated with arrays which quickly change values during program run. Let us note that adherents of what I call FALP frequently point out that anything an OOL can do a FALP can do, with fewer lines. Businesses may however like OOL for the enforcement of collaboration schemes and sharp division between outer and inner aspects of modules. The proposed new class of PWFL re-labels "pointer" to"warp" for those languages who have managed to handle pointers with such ease that they no longer appear to be mere assembly-like 'dangerous things' but are part of a seamless syntax, they are incorporated into the language and they are encouraged to be used through theoverall design of the language. The notion of the "warp"in its ethymology, I see, is connected to a 'branching off' from an otherwise linear progression (such as a flower maybe said to warp off in its stem). To this class I feel that one may fruitfully said that Forth belong, and to this class I would suggest some more developments could go, for there are perhaps not all that many examples as yet of such a kind of language, and Forth is tailor-made to very early types of computer processors and RAM sizes. It is a question of taste whether a language with a lot of pointer handling can be called a FALP or a PWFL language, if we for the moment look away from prefix/postfix features. For instance, some might be so used to C pointers that they are 'entirely easy' and 'obvious' and even 'seamless' to them. They might have nothing against this being called a 'warp-friendly prefix' language. Some might say that Forth is not at all that easy in its pointers after all. But I think it is objectively the case that Forth is indeed easy here. It is rather the primitiveness of its stacks and the names of its stack functions that clutter a typical Forth function. However the PWFL class doesn't require neatness nor advancement of stacks. The point I wished to muse over is whether we can see an alternative class of languages more suitable for a slight less hierarchical, slightly more 'anarchistic' and 'artistic' style of thinking, than object-oriented languages and flexible algorithmic languages like C. My intuition is that the answer is 'yes'. My own endavours so far has produced much of artistic and standalone-PC interest, but perhaps little that contribute to Internet applications. Let me complete this informal musing with a statement of belief: I believe in having clear-cut limits when anything is to be done well -- including programming, including networking between computers. Too much of over- cluttered syntax has been developed out of a greed for limitlessness. Limitations are what computers -- and design in any field -- are about. We have to learn to love them. A language is not a magical tool to remove all barriers, but should come along with bold barriers at the right places to encourage development within them. It is however different to erect syntactical barriers while keeping data as if limitless, than to create limitations of data and keep syntax as simple as possible. A good language of the PWFL kind has virtually no syntax -- but its data is far more settled within predesigned barriers than the case with FALP or OOL. This may lead to much less flexibility for the users, but far more predictability for the users -- and, ultimately, far more stability of the computer systems, for they do not get lost in complexities surrounding limitlessness ideas. The righteous idea in computing is the idea that a barrier makes sense.
Aristo Tacoma: Appreciation and Limits of Bohm's Dialogue Theory While the physicist David Bohm's approach dialogue make sense, is it somewhat simple? In the 1980s and early 1990s, the physicist David Bohm published a range of works, often in collaboration with others (e.g. his booklet On Dialogue and his book Unfolding Meaning, with contributions/editing by Peter Garret and Donald Factor) where a call for attention to hidden assumptions in group dialogue was made. But can we attend to all hidden assumptions? What I here will call "Bohm's dialogue theory" is based largely on my four-five interviews with David Bohm while he was at Birkbeck College, London University, and my participation in an Oslo weekend of dialogue (which I invited Bohm for, asked by the Forum 2000 group to do so, since I already had contact with Bohm, and which Forum 2000 co-arranged with Henrik B Tschudi), and it can be summarized in these points: * more than forty participants from all walks of life can talk in a group, so that assumptions of all kinds can be assumed to be present through the people * instead of taking purposes for granted, attention is given to purposes where it is considered as a possibility that the dialogue can "move beyond purposes" * anything said is given attention to, more than that agreement is sought * this leads, after a while, to an attention also to underlaying assumptions * one or several facilitators with experience in such dialogue can, without leadership, facilitate this attention process * a non-judgemental language is sought * small "cozy" groups tend to develop ways to avoid unpleasant disagreements but in that way contribute to a soldifying of hidden assumptions * as hidden assumptions are seen, lifted into attention -- suspended -- their limitations can be superceded * this can lead to a cultural revolution, a change of consciousness (for group and/or individual) While there is much about this which to me sounds just in the right spirit -- and coherent with the scientific attitude of laying aside prejudice and greed in favour of an open perception of unbiased fact -- as well as each one can do -- my own experiences and later attention- giving to these themes lead me to suggest two limitations, or possible mistakes, in this what we can call Bohm's "dialogue theory": A === The first point, A, is that when more than forty participants is present, though in principle it may certainly be likely that "all cultural assumptions are present", it is also extremely likely that, despite even clever facilitators, very few points of views will ever be given much space in the common attention room. There will be too much conflict, too much restlessness, too much unease, when certain points are mentioned which are too complicated to diminish in such a very large group. As for this point A, I suggest that there is no way we can avoid going through the dialogue that a person may have with herself, or himself, while writing, or while thinking over something that is read, or the dialogue that two, or three persons may have, or which may possibly arise as a group listens to one talker who is self-reflective, and who invites questions. In such a more limited occasion, there may be far more depth in each penetrating event of attention and thinking and feeling (in contrast to what Bohm called "thought" and "felt", ie, what has been thought and what has been felt), and the variety and broadness of this may arise simply given the willingness of those present to go beyond a small set of cultural assumptions, and by being very creative in applying this willingness to the concrete unfolding dialogue events. B === The second point, B, is that as for hidden assumptions, my own works in a variety of disciplines indicate that there are not tens, nor hundreds, but very many thousands of key assumptions in connection with any area of importance for humans.
Aristo Tacoma: Practical martial arts and sports martial arts -- an essential difference? Why practical martial arts may need to be taught entirely away from the sport versions of same It is commonly found that some forms of martial arts are taught not only as practical self-defence e.g. for young girls at night, but -- at the same time! -- as something which one can engage in as a sports, even (e.g. for tae- kwon do) as a formally Olympic sport. Is this is a viable approach? In the first sessions of a typical aikido, karate, judo or tae-kwon do course, one is typically exposed to entirely artificial situations and/or situations in which one is supposed to carry out certain techniques which presuppose a proximity to the other person that goes well beyond that which would have been regarded as safe in a situation possibly calling on genuine self-defence. Not only that, but in typical courses, as I have known them, of the just-mentioned kind, one keeps elaborating on these artificial situations incorporating also as-if attacks and as-if defences. The repetition of these artificial situations is then enforced by suitably grandiose events in which one earns something such as a colored belt, advancing within the ranks of the field. We all know of Bruce Lee's indiction that greater than any approach, any technique, is the person who masters improvisation beyond his own field. But how seriously is this taken as, every season, thousands and yet more thousands of beginners in all major cities are exposed to the artificiality of techniques for techniques' sake, and for the sake of the field as sport -- but in the name of "self-defence"? How many people walk away from a year or two of intense studying of these sports with an entirely self-deluded view on their own capability to defend themselves and their good friends if exposed to brutes who may want to attack them? To be sure, there are courses who sell themselves entirely on the point of "self-defence". But even these may incorporate much of the artificially safe situations which involve standing very near to the imagined attacker -- in the form of a fellow course-follower who would never do anything seriously bad. I doubt that many courses manage to step out of the artificality. Rather, I think it is a question which ought to be raised, whether it is ethical to sell these quasi-self-defence approaches as real self-defence when they so much likely should be called "sports, inspired by self-defence situations". Let me have it said that I am not an entirely "uninterested" observer -- quite on the contrary, I engage myself in producing a new form of martial arts, which I call "stamash". However, quite apart from the popularity or the lack of it of what I do, I feel it is the ethical thing to do, to ask the big questions about many of the traditional practises in this world of ours which require so much of insight and occasionally skill if one is going to be entirely safe in all circumstances.
Aristo Tacoma: Are There Active Paradoxes in the Foundations of Mathematics? The phrase "active paradox" means, an issue still going on, and unresolved 150 years is a very short period when it comes to mathematical foundational thinking. Yet all present foundations have been formally laid within that interval. Far from being a moot point, it is common sense to held up as scientifically an option that there are still active paradoxes in the foundations of mathematics. In the 1991 edition, hardcover, of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in the Macropaedia -- Knowledge in Depth books, the section "The Foundations of Mathematics", we can read === " the last decade of his scientific life Cantor became aware that his theory of sets pushed too far leads to contradictions; .." During the last 150 years, numbers, counting -- such foundational concepts in mathematics -- have been associated with a perhaps even more fundamental concept in mathematics -- that of the collection, the gathering, the "set" (for it is perhaps more fundamental to gather some items than to count them). And again and again during the past 150 years, it has been found that whenever gatherings become circularly self-referring in any way whatsoever, certain types of deep questions -- even in a sense paradoxes -- arise. It is these types of things that Cantor, who streamlined what rather became mainstream mathematical foundational theory in its crude essentials, at any rate, run into, and which is outlined in the excellent Encyclopaedia referred to above. It is not a moot point to ask afresh whether there still might be active paradoxes. By "active paradoxes" I mean some kind of inconsistency or other which not only do exist in principle, but which is in some way having an influence on what is regarded as important formal work. A typical overview over this type of questions tend to bring in the work of Kurt Goedel, from the first half of the 20th century, in a way which, if not is assuming that something was concluded by his work, it is at least not quite superceded in any genuine sense. However, from my own attempts at computer language renderings of his 60- page original German article on incompleteness (his second theorem), I know that it is not easy to enquire into Goedel's work in depth at the same time as the overall key question is kept vividly in mind: are there still active paradoxes in mathematics? Even possibly of a kind which is not understood even as we -- after years of work -- begin to understand Goedel's second incompleteness theorem? The fact that Goedel's work in this regard is acutely complex, must not delude us into thinking that it necessarily touches on all essence questions in this regard. Complexity, even with overwhelmingly fresh implications relative to what went before Goedel in this territory of pure thought, doesn't mean completeness -- not even when this complexity explicitly mentions "completeness" and its negation, "incompleteness". And as soon as we go deeply into Goedel, we are led into looking -- if we follow the conventional mainstream pathway of discussion in mathematics -- at Alan Turing's later attempts to circumvent some features of Goedel's proof, leading in some ways to a strengthening of the original result. If for the moment -- and here I speak in hindsight after working on what for me, personally and entirely outside of any scientific institution, has led to what I would call "good results" in bringing about an alternative view on set theory -- we ask the question of what characterises Cantor, Goedel and Turing taken as one whole, instead of focussing on details of the work of each of these large-brained people, we might get a set of clues which can be fruitful in a fresh, unprejudiced exploration of foundations. An example is this: common to Cantor, Goedel and Turing, and to others (such as Whitehead and Russell, in their work before Goedel's work, and in Zermelo- Fraenkel's set theory and its versions also in more recent years, and even in much of Brouwer's "intuitionist" work, as well as in Skolem's pre-Goedel work on non-categorical models of set formalisms), is the assumption that as long as one part of a set has finite members, then we can also say something about any of its other parts, even if we bring in the construct that this set can be filled up so as to be infinitely long. I repeat: -- In the last decade of his scientific life (writes E.Brittanica, in section Foundations of Mathematics), Cantor became aware that his theory of sets pushed too far leads to contradictions; [..]. Let us now explore without prejudice why some of these contradictions may lie in the concept of numbers as used at an informal level -- I am speaking of the whole number concept -- in that there are inherent assumptions which do not work out there. This leads me to suggest a wholly other approach to thinking about numbers (what I call essence numbers). For is it not so that when we speak of a collection or that which is sought to be given formal form as a so- called 'set' involves putting into explicit form that which more or less implicitly goes on when we speak of a certain 'type' of numbers? Consider, then, the informal language used when speaking of something such as "the type of the whole (or natural) number". Without trying to formalize this, is it not so that, as of this type, we mean something such as - - * the number doesn't have fractions * the number (in the case of whole, rather than natural numbers) may be signed * the number, even if possibly very huge, is finite * the number submits to clear-cut distinct rules of arithmetic such as the operation of adding 1 which always and in all cases gives one exact new number given an earlier one, and always so that this is bigger than the earlier we got * the number yields to an analysis into prime factors * there isn't any upper limit to this kind of number (or for signed numbers, not any limit in 'the other direction' either) Now if we could find that there is indeed some subtle inconsistency of sorts inside the assumptions governing our informal thinking about numbers, it would be far less unimaginable that once an attempt to formalize the 'set of all whole numbers' is made, then, "when pushed too far", explicit inconsistencies of some sort arise. But if it is not seen that this inconsistency hides at an 'early level' of our thinking, so to speak, it may reproduce in a way that is quite complex to detect. For after all, deductions from premises in the human discourse is a very finite process, while what is here sought to deduce over concerns itself with that which transcends the finite. Language involves the option of inventing new words at such times in which it is called for, to embrace new insights. But if this invention, or the re-definition of earlier terms, is such as to give an impression that all earlier sense of inconsistency or the like has been transgressed fully, it may hamper rather than improve the enquiry into these matters. (I will therefore not relate definitions of some forms of what by some has been called "transfinite", nor definitions of some forms of what has been called "completeness", as these happen within a discourse where the underlaying assumptions as I am about to sketch have not been properly addressed.) I will here go very slowly, in showing what I since 2003 (in a proposed exam thesis at master of art level at the University of Oslo, cognitive science dep.) and 2004 (as a chapter in book published privately now available at National Library of Norway,, pen name Stein von Reusch, ISBN 82-996977-0-0, with the long title "Passion without Greed or Hatred; resonating over dancers; creating new physics"), and even more clearly in the 2009 books published similarly, with ISBN numbers, and at the National Library of Norway, and listed at with full manuscripts) have purported, namely that the essential number concept cannot be that of what has been conventionally been named "natural number" or "whole number"; thereby the term "essence number". I will re-list the criterions listed above -- the type of criterions which are the ones that anyone reading any 18th, 19th or 20th century typical mainstream mathematical or number theory book would agree to -- as definition of a set, and then show that this set doesn't exist for it harbours a deep inconsistency (meaning, therefore, an incoherence in thought, which requires fresh perception to be lifted into our enlightened discourse). Let me, before I do this, say that I have looked for evidence that this type of reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning as I produced in 2003 has earlier been produced and published, either a long time ago or more recently. While I have found many discussions and many doubters to the typical set definitions -- and much interesting in the line of comments and half-successful attempts by the Dutch mathematician and philosopher L.E.J. Brouwer (in what is somewhat pretentious called "intuitionism"), -- I have found nothing at all that is anywhere near this exact proof. Here, then, are the above criterions in slightly more formal form, ignoring for the moment the signed numbers, which merely mirror the positive numbers and so doesn't add anything to this particular context: There is a set N such that *1* each member of N doesn't have fractions *2* each member (even if possibly very huge) is finite *3* each member submits to clear-cut distinct rules of arithmetic *4* to make the set, we can begin by 1, and apply the operation n+1 to the highest member included so far, and repeat this indefinitely *5* in short, therefore, for any member n a member n2 so that n2>n exists *6* each member yields to an analysis into prime factors -- other members It follows from this characterisation of the set N that it would be wrong to say that such a set is finite. For if it is finite, there would be a member n so that *5* doesn't hold. Now the criterion *2* taken together with the just- mentioned *5* yields, as I see it, an inconsistency, and there will also be issues about the characterisations found in *3* and even *1*, if what I say is true, when we apply the very innocent-looking criterion *4* to make the set. This seems, given the typical discourse around numbers in the 20th century and before, perhaps, quite surprising, as there has been no attempt whatsoever to include any type of member not finite into this set. But the point is that some of the other assumptions have this as an unwanted, and -- for this writer, no longer surprising -- implication. The most simple way to see this is what I call the 'graphical' version of the reductio ad absurdum proof. In this case, we imagine that we are building the set, starting with some members, then adding one, then one more, and so on -- but we do so by letting go of the conventional way of writing numbers in terms of digits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 since these have roughly equal size. Rather, we want a way that shows the size 'geometrically'. So we write an enormously simplified version, which is nevertheless entirely accurate, and translatable into normal digits, by simple letters I with a space in between, the number of I letters indicating what number we are concerned with: I for 1, I I for 2, I I I for 3, and upwards. This allows us to 'look' at the construction of the set, and we are aided in our mental visualization, -- and when we then ask questions concerning infinity, where we can no longer write geometrically the result on paper, we have had a clean start and can easily obtain coherent results. We apply the notion of 'adding 1, starting with 1', to obtain each new member. We then get first I I I that is, the set {1, 2}. (The first member is at the bottom-most line. The member numbers are read horisontally.) We proceed doggedly: I I I I I I Then I I I I I I I I I I Then I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Then, getting all the way up to the member 6 = "I I I I I I", we have I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I A monospace font, such as the typewriter-like, Courier New, should be used when viewing this, or the marks get too tight for the triangle to show -- the triangle whose top horisontal line shows the uppermost member of the so-far finite set, while the leftmost vertical line of I's indicate its present size. It should come as no surprise that the size of the set containing all members from 1 to 6 is, indeed, also 6. However it is a different type of perception -- it is not only geometrically different -- it is vertical, in this case -- namely this line: I I I I I I but the perception also involves the gathering {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} as a whole, in contrast to a perception merely of what we get to when we write 5 and then add 1 and get a new member 6. Having gone so slowly at the foundational concepts, we are at liberty to look into the coherence of imagining just what the set will look like when we consider the criterions above, which I re-iterate here: There is a set N such that *1* each member of N doesn't have fractions *2* each member (even if possibly very huge) is finite *3* each member submits to clear-cut distinct rules of arithmetic *4* to make the set, we can begin by 1, and apply the operation n+1 to the highest member included so far, and repeat this indefinitely *5* in short, therefore, for any member n a member n2 so that n2>n exists *6* each member yields to an analysis into prime factors -- other members Considering the criterion *5*, we are led into considering an operation which we can informally call 'etcetera', and which we geometrically can envisage as follows: * * * I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I This is the geometrical precise view of what can also be written, and has often in 20th century mathematical foundational literature, been written as: {1, 2, 3, ...} The meaning of the 'etcetera' should be, in a certain sense, very clear: we are seeing criterion *4* and *5* applied so that we come to higher, and still higher, and yet more high members, seemingly without end. On asking the question, again, as to the size of {1, 2, 3, ...} or, more precisely in this context, * * * I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I we are led to the proposition that this set is not finite. Ie, it is infinite. Not bounded. It goes on and on and on. So far nothing out of the usual mainstream has been said, although the particular geometrical depiction evolved for me through my 2003 work and onwards. Essentially, this is as far as we can get with paper- work, or with electronic typewriter work, on showing what must be the simplest type of number and what characterises it, starting with one and adding one, pure and simple arithmetic -- graphically speaking. In terms of the language discourse, we must however not stop there, but ask questions and enlist into our attention realm the proper answers that come from meditating over the whole situation -- and, in complicated situations, we must do so over days, weeks, maybe also months and years. I put to you, with all respect, that we have to do with an immensely complex situation and I regard it as unlikely that it will be properly perceived in its fullness even given a millenia of further discourse of the same kind as we have seen with regard to numbers considering the 20th century. I will begin by enlisting perceptions by the rediculously simple question: what can be said about the highest members of the set? Let us remind ourselves that *2* simply affirms -- I quote -- "*2* each member (even if possibly very huge) is finite". So -- and this is what every kid has been taught at school for a long, long time -- 'there isn't any highest member, we can always get higher. But it is still finite, each member is finite.' This is TAKEN AS A DEFINITION. But I am asking, let us look at what THE OTHER CRITERIONS IMPLY. And let us look if they do not imply something which defies *2* (and which may lead us to modify *3*. And if they do, we must admit that we must re- conceptualize the essential number concept. What this re- conceptualisation implies, may be something small or it may be something not small. I will give some indications why it may be the latter, and why it has something to say even about cosmology. Firstly, let us say, there is no hocus-pocus about * * * I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I This is nothing but what the criterion *4* says, I quote: "*4* to make the set, we can begin by 1, and apply the operation n+1 to the highest member included so far, and repeat this indefinitely" -- and indeed, however we define any infinite set of whole and finite numbers, given any of the entirely usual set of elementary arithmetic and typical thinking on sets in mainstream mathematics as of the 20th century, we can re-depict, or re-render (to use more a computer-like jargon), this particular set of finite numbers into that set. It simply shows what we are doing without the twists and turns of our elegant digits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 0. In other words, we are not merely showing here a particular syntactical quirk of one particular way of defining the natural numbers. We are showing THE VERY SET OF NATURAL NUMBERS -- or what is claimed to be the set of ALL AND ONLY FINITE POSITIVE WHOLE NUMBERS. And now I am asking: please look afresh, think afresh, meditate afresh if you wish, on the highest members in this set. The range of them. I am not trying to say that they summarize themselves into some magical number, any theta number or omega number of psi number of something like that. I agree that we have a range here; I agree that this range is infinite. I ask you to look at the nature of these numbers. Please attend, then, in your mind, to * * * I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I as you let it expand and expand in a 'moment of infinity', which I in 2003 called M.O.I., not referring to the French meaning right now. Let me suggest a way -- and think of whether you agree -- that this can be done. We have some definite steps quite near us -- the number 1, the step over to the number 2, then over to the number 3 or the I I I, and so on for a couple of numbers. This is all very distinct and clear. Let us imagine that we allow the numbers to blur a little, so that we can pick up a much, much higher number -- say, one hundred million, written in the ten-digit number approach as 100,000,000 or simply as 100000000. In order to telescope into this area we shift the focus to some area some meters -- or whatever -- up and beyond in our triangle, and get perhaps 99,999,999 in focus, then 100,000,000, then 100,000,001 -- allowing that which is above and under to blur in again. This blurring process we may refer to, visually, as a kind of 'continuum'. I don't mean it to be actually a continuum, I merely mean that we cannot meaningfully focus on one hundred million numbers all at once in a discrete fashion, so we visualize as a rather continous curve, which is then discrete just where we focus at it. Let me attempt to symbolize this: * * * 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 * * * I I I I I I The three stars in the middle now symbolize the 'blurring'. Obviously, we can get any number, as high as we want, if we at all can spell it out and think about it, anywhere in this list -- any whole positive number, no matter how high is in it. Obviously. But now, please, attend to the very highest numbers -- the class of them. What can we say about this class? Try to focus it. What can we say about it? How can we get nearer to say anything about it? You see, this is the type of discourse that you cannot find in serious published mathematical journals of the 18th, 19th or 20th century. You can find much talk about the real number continuum, so-called, and about how difficult it is to get it handled by means of the more 'countable' and more 'linear' integer set. But this simple question and enlisting of what Karl Popper (in a footnote in his two-volume post-WWII book 'The Open Society and Its Enemies') called 'intellectual intuition', concerning something so essential as pure numbers -- this is not regarded as active good number theory enquiry. This is regarded, I think, as moot, as poppygock, as stuff for fanatics who are on the side of the real issues, or for those who haven't read the real big masters deeply enough. Let me say: this is not moot, this is not poppygock, this writer is not a fanatic, but applies doubt and dialogue and has had many clever good sharp thinkers agree in talking this over, and there has been more reading by this writer of all the great thinkers both of the West and the East than what is the case even for most highly educated people. Also, very few who have a degree in foundational mathematics have worked seriously with compiler design and with actual building of an entirely new platform -- these things do sharpen the brain when it comes to looking into classical questions. Let us continue, then, to think about the class of the highest members, which we come to by this process: * * * I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I In one of the earlier publications (the book for 2004), I proposed that each member we have seen so far has a property I there called 'self-reflective'. Self- reflective means something much like self-referring. I'll define it here by example -- I have much discussions of this in my works listed for free at and (which before March 22, 2010 was called and, but the web hotel refused to give codes when I wished to go to another web hotel so I re-made the names then, and did some quick replacements here and there of to in some of the main files). When we have three members, I I I = 3 I I I we see that the highest member, 3, is also the number of the members in the set. The set {1, 2, 3} has a size which is 3, and, lo and behold, 3 is also within the set. This seems so obvious it hardly seems worth pointing out, but it is a subtle point, so please have the patience for going with me on it. I I I I = 4 I I I I I I Here is the set where the highest member is 4. This set has, indeed, 4 members. The set {1, 2, 3, 4} has size 4. So this is the self-reflective property. How we visualize the self-reflective property? We visualize it most naturally by attending to the leftmost vertical line of I-bars. In the case of the set with 6 members, this is obviously I I I I I I and so when the uppermost horisontal line is I I I I I I we can say: we have to do with a triangle here, where there is a property of geometrical symmetry -- and a perfect one, if we had subtly modified the monospace font to be exact relative to its linewidth: I I I I I I I * I * I * I * I* This symmetry is akin to the self-reflective property. This is easily imagined to apply for any finite number. Let us now imagine that we carry out the process to infinity in the by now well-known shape * * * I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I and ask: have we at any point got a breaking of this symmetry? Have we at any point got a breaking of the self-reflective property? And naturally, we want to say: we haven't got information of any such breaking. Quite on the contrary, since the graphical depiction above contains just about every piece of information we have got as to the natural increase of the set of numbers when we begin with one, we are led to see this as a process which goes on and on without a sharp shifting of properties. Let us then keep this in mind, while we ask more precisely about the size of the set, relative to the geometrical depiction of the set. Again, what is its size? Finite or infinite? It is infinite, naturally. Then how is it the size of the set is indicated? By the leftmost vertical line of I's. Let us put the three dots typically used in mathematical notion for 'et cetera', as in {1, 2, 3, ...}, on top of the leftmost vertical line, to indicate that we consider the size of the set to be infinite: . . . I I I I I I This, then, should be entirely clear in meaning: the set has a size which is not finite. What, then, of the self-reflective property? What, then, of the geometrical depiction of the set relative to its members? I I I I I I I * I * I * I * I* We ought to have a symmetry here -- we have introduced no breaking of symmetry between the leftmost vertical line and the uppermost horisontal line. This seems almost so simple that it is rediculous to point it out, -- all this may seem hampering at trivia. But, forgive me for pointing it out, but if the leftmost vertical line is as said, . . . I I I I I I then certainly the symmetrical situation is this: I I I I I I . . . and this summarises itself neatly into the diagonal version with the stars as we have had repeatedly in the above: * * * I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I And I wish to extract from this one proposition that you can think about, as to whether you agree, quite apart from all the geniuses who spent time on APPLYING the so- called 'natural number set' rather than thinking about the class of the uppermost members of it like we have done here: Proposition 1. There is no way in which a set which is built by starting with 1, then adding 1 to each highest member, can be said to be not finite, unless -- by the self-reflective property -- it can be said to have members which are not finite. Members which are not finite -- that is to say, members which are nonfinite. Members which correctly reflect the size of the nonfinite set. Members which have not been defined relative to the conventional elementary arithmetic that we began with. Members that we do not want to have by criterion *2*, but which the building- method in criterion *4* lead to anyway: *1* each member of N doesn't have fractions *2* each member (even if possibly very huge) is finite *3* each member submits to clear-cut distinct rules of arithmetic *4* to make the set, we can begin by 1, and apply the operation n+1 to the highest member included so far, and repeat this indefinitely *5* in short, therefore, for any member n a member n2 so that n2>n exists *6* each member yields to an analysis into prime factors -- other members And in fact not only the sets built exactly by *4* can be said to have this feature of containing unwanted non- finite members of a kind not handled by conventional arithmetic, but EVERY set that can be laid out in a one- to-one mapping with whole positive numbers and which has a construction rule which can be applied without end. That is to say, Proposition 2. There is no set N={1, 2, 3, ...} which is such that it has only finite, and all finite, positive whole numbers yielding to the laws of elementary arithmetic. Which again, on thinking more about this, leads us to say, Proposition 3. The least possible set {1, 2, 3, ...} of a kind which contain all finite positive whole numbers yielding to the laws of elementary arithmetic is a set containing members of a different, nonfinite kind, about which elementary arithmetic as given has not been defined to work against. I hope, for those who have read much of Cantor's most influential works, that it is entirely clear that nothing of what he says about going beyond the type of infinity that he associates with the set N of natural numbers relating to higher forms of infinities as he associates with the set R of real numbers has taken into consideration the above propositions, and so his definitions do not work out in this context given that what I have said is coherent and consistent within itself, as I have by now every good reason to believe. (Also, those who have read about "limits", please be aware that similar incoherencies apply there, as is pointed out in great depth in some of my other publically available writings.) What follows, rather, are propositions such as the following: Proposition 4. There is a fundamental property of self- reference and infinity about the essential number concept that is derived, by analogy, from elementary arithmetic on small numbers like 1, 2, and 3, and which we should give a new name. Definition. This new type of number, as indicated in prop. 4, can be called "essence numbers", and E can be the name of the set of these. Proposition 5. We should expect self-reference to arise whenever there is any formal system of any type involving natural numbers OR OTHER SETS DERIVED FROM THIS IN ANY WAY, including, the so-called "real number set", the "imaginary numbers", etc. Corollary 1 to prop. 5. Goedel's second incompleteness theorem is a property of a certain type of self-reference which is not as essential as the self-reflective property found to apply for the most essential form of numbers. Corollary 2 to prop. 5. Coordinate systems involved in continuity theorems such as general relativity theory -- and, all the more so, when these involve concepts of the 'infinitely small' or 'infinitesimal' (as GRT do), which is a construction characterised by almost exactly the same incoherence as we found in the construction of the set N, must be seen as incoherent patterns of formal thought -- leaving aside the question of the possible reality (or not) of what these coordinate systems refer to. (This doesn't mean that these incoherent formalisms do not at times work.) Corollary 3 to prop. 5. Formalisms erected by means of integrals and similar constructs, which all hinge upon not only the natural number set N with its incoherence, but also on repeated applications of the notion of the infinitely large and the infinitely small without proper regard for the self-reflective property as indicated above, are in essence incoherent. This also applies for such formalisms as used in quantum theory. Corollary 4 to prop. 6. Cosmology cannot be based on the existing formalisms found, as of 2010, in quantum theory and general relativity theory. Rather, whatever views humanity has about cosmos must be seen as metaphors, images, and visualisations, and whatever there is of calculation which happen to fit with numerically precise observations of some kind, must be seen as interesting but in no way whatsoever an indication that these formalisms can be applied in an essential way, any more. Well, I don't think it can be said more clearly, nor that it should be said more clearly. Anyone who has a good mind and who reads the above will see that there is not a trace of any serious error in it. Still, one can argue with oneself for years and years and decades and I predict this is too much of an issue for the human mind to tackle -- for infinities are dangerous-looking things to most. But if you are in the mood to say: Thank you, enough of your reductio ad absurdum, I would like now to hear, in positive, constructive terms, what DOES IN FACT WORK, rather than hear continous hampering on the incoherence of those bygones things of the remote formal past which hasn't got any future -- then I would say: all right, but for a start, work on cleansing yourself from belief in the silly pompeous self-certain proclamations that are given in the name of natural science over and over again -- not just doubting the fairy tales of the religions. Then, work on cleansing your intuition, your intuitive intellect, in all the ways that make good creative sense. Having done as much, there are meditations -- even something of a deductive nature -- that I have put forth in my books -- which take this as a starting-point, and leaves what should be left behind. This, however, is not within the scope of this article. Thank you for the attention. March 26, 2010 Aristo Tacoma, alias Stein Henning Braten Reusch.
Aristo Tacoma: Learning Organisations Revisited What does it really take for organisations as a whole to learn? (More than a decade after The Fifth Discipline) In the 1990s, quoting phycisist thinking about "the implicate order" by D.Bohm on the first page, P. Senge produced an influencial book called The Fifth Discipline where he and his MIT group suggested that organisations as a whole can learn given dialogue. This even reached political circles. Where does it stand now? In the first part of the 1990s, a centrist and green- oriented politician in Norway, Per Olav Lundteigen, enjoyed a book highly critical of computers written by Espen Holm, and invited Mr Holm to make a seminar for the government and parliament (Stortinget) members like himself where the question of the limitations of computer technology relative to the wellfare state was put into focus from one who had insight into the limitations and dangers of computer technology. Holm took contact with several key consultants for large corporations, and brought along me -- perhaps due to my contact with David Bohm earlier on (this was after Bohm unfortunately had passed away), or due to my eco-orientation due to my contact with Arne Naess (I conducted several interviews with him at the time for a magazine I was co-editing, and spent also time with Naess and my girl-friend at the time, Anna K. D. Evans, up in the mountains) -- to give the opening lecture. This happened at April 17, 1996, in a seminar / cinema room underneath the Stortinget building. That, on its own, doesn't imply I knew much about organisational learning. However, I tried to catch up as well as I could with the concept, and followed a number of developments for a little while with great interest, musing on my own. The physics, or -- more precisely, the metaphysics, of a key inspiration for Senge was that of the implicate order idea of Bohm. This has several very different versions, one in which several implicate order stands on top of each other and all spring out of the background quantum vacuum field, alongside the manifest world-as-we- know it, the so-called (in Bohm's terms) "explicate order". Bohm contended that the structures we have at hand -- mani-fest, mani meaning hand -- are expressions of a much more complicated, finely woven (=subtle) structure, and that the key feature of reality is that of undivided movement of flowing wholeness. My interview with physicist professor Holger Bech Nielsen at the Bohr Institute, Copenhagen, gave me the information that this metaphysics is regarded by many physicists as more or less obvious and taken for granted (in contrast to the specific "boehmian" interpretation of quantum theory). Abstractly, then, we might see even something such as string theory and its later versions (M-theory etc) as examples of an implicate order approach to reality. How does this entwine with organisations and their need for change in a changing world? For one thing, Senge contented that organisations must appreciate that a vaster order beyond their explictly defined structure on paper does exist, and that this order must be allowed to be given attention and, at times, also change. He also contented that it can do so by allowing a more free form of dialogue internal in the company, in which -- as for Bohm's approach to dialogue - - one must be willing to lift any assumptions, also about purposes, into attention. Many people have written on the successes, the partial successes, and the apparent or real failures of attempting organisational learning and related approaches at various levels in organisations of small, large and very large kinds, political as well as (more common) commercial. However, -- though others may have a different point of view -- it doesn't seem to have been either a strong confirmation of the original idea of organisational learning as according to Senge (and others), nor a strong disconfirmation or any entirely new approach with a similar fierce energy (some spoke at the time of a "revolution"). (In addition, the implications of networking -- in particular the world wide web -- are so pervasive that the changes brought about here have tended to go faster than any theorizing over consciously implemented change brought about by essentially discursive means.) I contend that organisational learning has a future given three insights, which must be cultivated: === that an individual has an inner flowing order greater than the explicate order of any organisation === that the number of hidden assumptions in each individual is so enormous that in order to enhance coherence, an organisation ought to select high-quality events of a scientifically rich and unprejudiced kind as a main cultural hapenning, quite often, so as to address a large number of these assumptions -- instead of merely talking about them === that the meaning of work lies in the liberty to take enjoyment in objective quality for its own sake, and that the formulations involving the company as for big goals (see another informal musing of mine about 'big goals of companies') ought to strengthen this liberty (in contrast to the focus on mere satisfaction for the customer, which, however good it may be, will only be real if there is quality as foundation for that satisfaction in the product, objectively speaking).
Aristo Tacoma: Why the Non-semantic Internet is More Semantic than the Semantic Internet The right internet doesn't try to meddle with the domain of the human mind, but stimulates the human mind It is by some claimed that internet is bound by some peculiar form of necessity to "evolve" from focussing on the matching of mere words to matching meaning, or semantics. It is purported by this independent writer that attempt to meddle with matching with meaning will diminish the meaningfulness of the internet, and that the proper evolution of internet means sticking by the principle that the domain of the computers proper is the syntactical, not the semantic. What is the natural evolution of an internet which in many ways have been creating its success through a focus on free matching of texts against texts? There are those who purport that the necessary evolution is to go from syntax to semantics, from mere text matching to meaning matching. As an independent writer and programmer, I would like to offer the point of view that the most meaningful internet for me is an internet which leaves meaning to the domain of living minds and which focusses its computational energies on providing more of the same it has already come up with, namely a matching on texts, on words, on syntax. As any theorist of science should know, there is for any set of data a limitless number of possible theories. One may find more beauty or some kind of simplicity in some theories, but it is not always simple to select the most simple theory. On occasion of a leading theorist of science, Quine, having his 90th birthday celebrated in the Norwegian Academy of Letters and the Sciences, I asked -- not Quine, but a major student of his, chairing the event, of whether (I took quantum theory as example) it is always easy to select the simplest theory. Is it simple to select the simplest theory? I got ten minutes as answer from Quine's student, but then Quine cleared his voice and answered far more simply: "No, I agree, it is not always simple to select the simplest theory." Now, for "theory" substitute "meaning". For "data" substitute "words, images, and the like". What anything means to anyone may be radically different from what the same means to anyone else. And it may not be simple, or easy, or even a worth the while task to begin on, to try to select a canonical interpretation (cfr also Thoralf Skolem's work from the 1920s on there not being canonical models in set theory). One of the wonderful things about computers is their rugged mechanicalness. One of the least wonderful things about the most despicable operating systems is their attempt to "understand" the user, while in the process failing to be a robust tractor-like machinery which obeys the orders of the user. One may be a technical genius, one of the very foundational people of the world wide web itself, and, when it comes to human real meaning, a completely self- deluding person. If this person claims that the necessary evolution is from a web of text matching to a web of semantic matching, it may be that this person is giving words to something which too-big and too-greedy conglomerates desire: to control not only the flow of physical information, but to control how this information is perceived, -- the overall meaning of humankind. It is only possible to make a semantic-matching network by artifiicial intelligence. And a person who has a self- reflective, critical distance to hype about too-eager technological developements would then remind herself, or himself: "artificial intelligence -- more artifiical than intelligent."
THEMES UPDATE as of APRIL, 2010. Written by Aristo Tacoma -- After the books, booklets and other texts published on my only two websites, and, during philosophical parts of the discussions in my stamash courses and other such connections, some scientific and other themes have occurred rather recurrently and I've seen it fit to give a typical reply in a very summarily form to these, here, in written form. This, then, only to make it easier to think about the very broad and largely complete range of inferences and viewpoints (also intuitions) as given in my earlier texts, esp. the 2003 to 2009 productions. I emphasize that nothing of what is here said can in any way be said to replace anything of the much more broad and wholesome and holistic treatments given in those texts: it is merely that it requires a little bit of thinking to go from those texts to some of the points which perhaps some would like to go into given what's in the media right now. For this reason, please do not quote anything inside such a THEMES UPDATE of mine, because it presupposes the full self-reflective context of and Taken in isolation, the points will not have enough intellectual backing-up. Here, then, are the points: * Some people have asked me: What is really the measurements in physics -- the tunnel collisions underneath the ground in Switzerland and all that -- all about, if the formalisms that they've got are as incoherent as I say? Now I have to say, first of all, that NOT ONE SINGLE MATH-EDUCATED PERSON -- nor even my guiding professor Herman Ruge Jervell at the University of Oslo -- doubted that the line of argument I produced that one cannot close of the set {1,2,3,...} to only contain finite members is correct. Everyone of them has agreed to the proof. Early on, they asked, however, two things: (1) Has not anybody already said this? (2) Are there really any implications of this? As for (1), the answer seems to be that as of published material, it is clearly no, though there are obviously intimations of insights that conventional views on sets are wrong esp. in L.E.J.Browver's writings. But nothing like this. (2) Are there really implications of this? This is what I have sort of waited unfolding until I was sure that I had viewed every possible permutation of possible counter-argument. And now, as you can vividly see here and there in my writings, these implications are spelled out; and indeed, one of these is that mainstream physics whether 20th century or slightly improved upon within certain very abstract fields known as superstring and M-theory and such lacks a coherent formalism. It is also the case that the model monopoly created by Niels Bohr and his group is quite definitely standing, despite the claim one occasionally hears that one has really gone beyond that in mainstream physics by now. Some very slight modifications in mainstream physics have occurred, conceptually speaking, and much technical and very much empirical work but the ideas still stand in all their muddy insistence, and dominates quite as much as before. And I say, they lack of a formalism. I also say, that doesn't mean that this formalism doesn't SOMETIMES work. But it means that when physicists speak with certainty about billions of past years and big bangs and what not they are not ONLY adding a lot of ad hoc hypotheses to the main theories to make their house of cards stand, but they are ALSO engaging in uncalled-for extrapolation of the domain of application of their not-coherent formalisms. So what then are they measuring on? The answer is, of course, very simple: they are measuring what they don't know, on things they don't know any thing about. And they are drawing from these measurements hot-headed money-acquiring inferences, suitable for big books and big media-headlines, which the numerical correlations found in the empirics do not vouch at all for. They are not anywhere near one second or one trillionth of a second any creation point. There isn't any such creation point. Rather, a more coherent understanding would appreciate the unfoldment of the whole continuous creation/unfoldment in one instant -- as one big whole -- not expanded from a point. This is relatively constand in size, with an expansion at all points, not rhythmically so but arrythmically so, cosmically speaking; with a destruction going on at the peripheries. When one tries to pick apart minute bits of matter and minutes bits of energy what one will do is merely to irritate matter: it is a coercion of matter that matter is not supposed to go through, especially not here at Earth, and so they are wrong -- not wrong in the sense that they create as unintentional byproduct any bomb, but wrong in the sense that they pollute the sense of dignity with which humans should relate to their creation. * On what I call Spring/BI impressionism, I have given various notes, various indications, and I have tried to give a broadness to these which can be very encompassing and so open up for a lot of 'redefinitions within itself' without having to lead to a breaking with the very generous, and, I must say -- and still feel -- beautiful premises on which it has been launched. Let me clarify, at this stage, one point: While I strongly advice all uses of computers to be filled with the insight of not messing about with too much attempt at imitating real reality, but being more modest, more oriented towards stimulation and less about simulation (of 3D or whatever, but the latter -- 3D or RD -- can be brought in when there is a great understanding of first-handedness in relationship to computers as foundation), and advice, as a general point of view, that computer-monitor light green is more generous towards female beauty and thus towards beauty in general than much use of any other screen color -- for reasons precisely given -- this shining sweet succession of green photons can hardly find any correct representation when we're talking paint on canvas. Very obviously, then, we can speak of the use of much white-blue, in order to emphasize light, where the cartoon-like element can be indicated by light, quick, pen-like motions of something such as blue-blue-violet acryllic against such a white-blue underground, somewhat wet to emphasize a blurring effect, -- as entirely being part of what we can call "classic Spring/BI". Printed on paper, this can be simply black lines on paper; or, we can enlarge blue pen drawings into art prints with some use of plastic and computer reproduction to get a similar impression as paintings, however in a quantity that is larger (e.g. 100 signed and numbered) so that prices can be smaller. * On what can be called "the fall of darwinistic and other form of localist/mechanical biology": * This is not the same as any fall of biology, or the logic and teaching of "bio" (as in biosphere), the teaching of life. This merely the same as to say: we will no longer confuse a mere programme of trickstery with manipulation of bits and pieces of living organisms, and politically inspired mechanical paradigms with scarce evidence for the grandiose postulates, as a real insight into life, its beauty, its function, its unfoldment and its past. We will have to be tremendously eclective when we unfold a true new branch of science, called, without false pretense, "biology", or the teaching of life. * The fashion word "epigenetic" is still mechanistic, and so would any term such as "epi-epi-genetic" and so forth. * My pointing out of the importance of realizing that the nonlocal version of de Broglie pilot wave interpretation of the core numerical findings subsummarized inside "quantum physics" need not be inconsistent is not to say that it is any other than an awakening towards a greater understanding which transcends the pettiness of earlier studies within this field totally. * The relevance for biology for realizing that the may be such subtler forms of reality as de Broglie wanted to begin to work with, combined with other realizations as I put forth in my so-called "supermodel theory", is that the manifest measurable genes (of which the so-called "biologists" understand nearly as little as a toddler throwing stones on a large car engine running on a workshop, suspended, to see what happens when various stones are thrown at various spots at it) may be merely a very small part of the reality of the physical presence of an organism. * Anybody who talks quickly about the word-pair "genes vs. environment", or "nature vs. nurture", is within a certain type of localist thinking and has lack of self-reflectiveness as regards the wholeness of the physical world -- this dyad of concepts is petty, mediocre and falls short of summarizing the possible sources of influences. It is not enough to add "culture", "interaction" or the like -- for in the present context, all that still has a localist interpretation. * That which is nonlocal is not merely Carl Gustav Jung synchronistic, not necessarily all that followerings of Jung may call by that concept: it is merely a common term for all that falls outside of the newtonian mechanical model monopoly even as extended by Einstein. * The nonlocal has room for many forms of subtle realities. * The quasi-gurus trying to teach on the nonlocal or on quantum-inspired healing may find it better not to teach anything at all: this is still to new to be handled by any guru-like person. Rather, turn to an improvised, non-vatican, non-protestant, pro-reincarnation form of christian prayer. * There are various sections of the Koran which can be interpreted towards the notion that their main prophet is merely having a role in the past, so as to open gateways for a true coming of the very same second coming as in the christian Bible: these things are, in part, spelled out very, very clearly. The interpretation possibilities of all these books of the past are, however, so wide that they can be used to quasi-justify about anything at all, and cannot replace the personal conscience of each reincarnating being. * While I fly between themes of the scientific and the theological let me point out that anyone who claims EITHER a scientific understanding OR a theological understanding (let alone both!) and who have not explored an eclectically fresh-thought version of berkeleyan philosophy (in which it is not only 'all is mind' but rather, 'all is within God's mind'), alongside the ever-expansiveness of medieval priest/ philosopher Anselm, with elements of the half-christian Whitehead in his Process and Reality, spiced up with "Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Theory" by J.S.Bell, haven't really begun on the journey. Do please begin on the journey: complement it with late writings by Popper, by browsing all late writings of Louis de Broglie spiced with David Bohm writings, and give a regular meditation on not only what I say of essence numbers but also how I combine essence numbers with supermodel theory, if you like. * What can be called "the fall of the Vatican", which spiritually (although not yet economically) has happened (with this sect just as with, to take an example at random, the Church of Scientology -- where money still flows in due to rich idiots being members, and due to large treasury boxes, but where the spiritual authority has gone and withered completely and irreversibly), is not at all in any way the fall of the teaching of the Christ, if we by the latter think eclectically coptic and combine with eclectically hindu, and meditate and -- above all, -- pray, so as to get insight beyond any particular book and any particular shrine and any particular church father or mother or interpretation or school. This type of prayer I strongly recommend, as it is the foundation of the meditation which may otherwise go astray in model monopolies that are undiscerned as yet by the unenlightened human thought at present. It has to be a prayer, though, which doesn't follow conventional schemes. The few notes of a perhaps lightly buddhistic kind that I give are very deeply intended and the fact that they are sparse and not given as a chapter on their own nor given extra large font doesn't meant that they are not among the by far most important things I say. I wish however those who really have the gift for finding out what's really worth looking into to find it first. The other notes, some of which are of a predictive nature, are so self-fulfilling it seems hard to believe that they are written earlier on instead of later on, but so it is. This "fall of the Vatican", or of so-called -- the mis-named "catholic christianity" is not due to their sensuality, but due to their hypocrisy around their sensuality. One can now understand that their rediculous aggression against the use of condoms even in areas with strong overpopulation and strong infection of the very serious AIDS/HIV type has a basis in something entirely different than theological themes. The aggression the Vatican pope has against condoms is rather that he doesn't want anything to come in between the loving relationships that the priests and the young 'uns have. Is that irreverent? It is not, for the Vatican has ZERO spiritual authority. Had they spoken about the true distinction of their own problems of the past with dignity, they would have had the guts and the conscience to say: when we were burning pretty, magically beautiful girls in the name of "witches", then we did something very seriously wrong and bad, and when we now have the lie of celibacy going on, and the aggression against condoms and abortions, this becomes rediculous when priests in secret practise the love of children in the physical form. But it is still very much more bad to burn young girls than for a priest to fondle a boy: yet then the teaching of the Vatican has to say YES to sensuality and to child-loving-ness, or paedophilia, and when they do not, their hypocrisy combined with their immense material and political power in African and in Latin America and in subsections of the rest of Earth is identical to their now-happened irreversible downfall. There is no more catholisism anymore: they are now merely, like the scientologists, a church in name only. I repeat, this is not due to the fact that they were engaging in sensuality, but the fact that they did not do so in absolute total openness, using their political power to change views on sensuality towards the more natural openness. Instead, their vows became their hypocrisy, and their purported theology became their senility. * It is part of consciousness to have a proper and sensitive relationship to duration. Some responses must come within the second, some must come within some seconds, some must come within the day, some can come after years, and so on. If duration is messed up, then consciousness is messed up. If the Vatican needs another thousand years to approve of sensuality, they have messed up their duration. They cannot use years and years to think about that which to all people of natural insight is obvious after at most a day of thinking. If they do require years and years in such cases this is not evidence of wisdom but of shortsightedness, and not evidence of great consciousness or great conscience but of messed-up confused consciousness and reduced conscience. Catholic christianity has no rescue: and all those who still accepts that label on themselves, "catholic", must from now on be seen as more or less conscience-less people who crave togetherness in a community so much that they don't care for the integrity of the teachings of the community. This is the obvious state of fact given a neutral view of the news all across the free world. * I often refer to "model monopoly" but I realize that the way I use this concept, which my father Stein Braten authored in the 1970s (see some source writings with ISBN numbers referred to in his biographical list which I sustain at the site, while he has other publications after the point that site was completed -- 2007 -- with various publishers, cfr such places as about that), hasn't quite been clearly defined the way I tend to use it without question, so to speak. This is based in part of my discussions of this concept with my father, and in part it is based on my own work in the theory of science, where I find Kuhn's introduction of the concept "paradigm" as short-sighted and in need of modification by just something such as "model monopoly" concepts. For some might see "paradigm" as positive, while it is clear that "model monopoly" is exactly what we don't want. I will complete this THEMES UPDATE by giving sketch of my definition of "model monopoly", alongside an indication of how to dismantle such a situation. MODEL MONOPOLY is (def.) a situation in which some people engage in power (mis)use relative to some other people by nurturing a set of wholly or partially incorrect postulates and definitions and views (and such) so that only a select portion of these (apt to misguide) are given to these other people. These people might be a company, a state, a so-called "idealistic organisation", an informal group with cross-sections into many parts of a society (often including media), or the like. In science, people running the mainstream agendas of the so-called scientific programmes may engage in a model monopoly, however often so that even people who are rather much initiates are not at all really clear as to what the deepest postulates are. To dissolve a MODEL MONOPOLY, -- which, when it is uncritically and enthusiastically accepted by folly people is sometimes called a "paradigm" -- a disclosure of key hidden assumptions must take place, alongside constructive efforts to bring about alternative and more correct assumptions. * A model monopoly in economical thinking which some people try and come with is this: that the only alternative to free enterprises of a kind which serves profit within laws as the only constraints are a bored state-ruled economy. False dualism, false dyads of thinking, must be transcended by looking at the premises involved. The dedication to quality and to a sensitivity for the overall implications of what one is doing beyond any limited, false ideology (such as "when everybody is egotistic and selfish it tends to work out"), I outline both in my webpages where I speak of currency day-trading as a valuable alternative, and far more ethical one, than stock-trading, and also in the addition done March 2010 this year [as listed above on this page] where I speak of quality and constraints relative to big goals of companies, and also about learning organisations. [Archived texts on this page all from before 2011, written by Aristo Tacoma, alias S H W Bråten Reusch; They can be redistributed using the same type of copyright and redistribution notice as written on the always updated page, pls confer it]